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FREEDOM OF ThE PRESS AND
THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE
Michael Alan Schwartz
Allen P. Karen This article is concerned primarily with an analysis of the newsman's alleged privilege of non-disclosure of confidential sources of information, which
privilege has been asserted by the attorneys for the
Defendant reporters in the Caldwell and Pappas cases,
currently on the docket of the Supreme Court of the
United States.

Although there is a third case on the

current docket (Branzburg v. Hayes,

,o. 70-58) posing

the samae questions as those in Pappas and Caldwell,
this case has not been analyzed as the fact pattern is
iarkedly different from those in the other two cases.

"Third Year Students, Fordham University Law School
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INTRODUCTION - No journalist's Privilege at Common Law

"Neither in England nor in the United States does
the common law give a newsman the privilege to conceal
confidential sources."'i

"It is a general principle of

our judicial system that witnesses properly summoned
before a court must give their testimony unless specifically privileged or exempted." 2

"For more than three

centuries it has been recognized as fundamental maxim
that the public.. .has a right to everyman's evidence.
When we come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give testimony one is capable of giving,
and that any exceptions which may exist are distinctly
exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive
3

general rule.1'

'The duty to testify at judicial proceedings is a
venerable instrument of justice which was recognized
early in the development of English law and has been
clearly acknowledged by the Supreme Court."'4

The power

to compel testimony extends to grand juries and to the
taking of depositions. 5

It has also been held applica-

ble to legislative inquiries.

6

It is asserted that the power to compel testimony is
necessary in grand jury proceedings.
serves two important functions:

The grand jury

"to examine into the

commission of crimes" and "to stand between the

prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether
the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was
dictated by malice or personal ill will.

"7

The purposes of grand jury inquiries necessitates a
broad scope, a wide latitude, and a correlative authority to question witnesses almost without limitation as

8
to subject matter.

In exceptional circumstances,

such

as situations involving the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination, the obligation to testify
is subject to mitigation.

Where public policy justifies

protection of a particular confidential relationship,
privileged situations have been found to exist.

"The

common law recognized only four relationships which
gave rise to privileged communications:

attorney-client,

husband-wife, informant-government, and juror-juror.
Two others, physician-patient and clergyman-penitent
have received almost universal statutory implimentation. ''9
that

It is clearly the general rule at common law

journalists enjoy no special right

to withhold

testimony relating to confidential communications
tween themselves

be-

and their sources of information."

Courts have uniformly denied the existence of a reporters privilege

11

with but two exceptions.

12

10

THE UALDWELL DECISION
Earl Caldwell is a black New York Times reporter
who was based in San Francisco and who wrote a series
of articles on the Black Panther Party and its leaders.
After several months, during which time Caldwell developed confidential relationships with several members
of the Black Panther Party, the Times published a series
of Caldwell's articles throughout 1969, which covered
the activities and attitudes of the Panthers.
On 2 February 1970, a federal grand jury, investigating possible breaches of federal criminal law by
members of the Black Panther Party, subpoenaed Caldwell
to appear before it to testify.

A subpoena duces tecum

directed Caldwell to bring with him his notes and tape
recordings of interviews with officers and spokesmen
of the Black Panthers.

Caldwell and the Times moved to

quash the subpoena, or, alternatively, to issue a protective order.

The District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of California issued the protective order but
denied the motion to quash.

The order protected

Caldwell from being compelled to "answer questions concerning statements made to him or information given to
him by members of the Black Panther Party unless such
statements or information were given to him for publication or public disclosure." 1 3

The order provided that

he could not be required to reveal confidential
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associations and information acquired by him as a news
gatherer unless the government showed "a compelling
and overriding national interest in requiring Mr.
Caldwell's testimony which cannot be served by any al1 4

ternative means. T

As the events transpired, the term of the old grand
jury expired and a new grand jury was sworn.

On 22

May 1970, a new subpoena was served on Caldwell directing him to appear and containing the provisions of the
protective order.

Caldwell refused to appear and was

held in civil contempt.

On appeal by Caldwell, the

Government having taken no appeal from the protective
order, the United States Court of !ppeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the judgment of contempt.

15

Caldwell had argued that the "inevitable effect of
the subpoenas will be to suppress vital First Amendment
freedoms.. .by driving a wedge of distrust and silence
between the news media and the militants and... in the
absence of a compelling governmental interest - not
shown here'"1 6 his appearance before the grand jury
should not be required.
The Court of Appeals held
"Appellant asserted in his affidavit that
there is nothing to which he could testify
(beyond that which he had already made public
and for which, therefore, his appearance is
unnecessary) that is not protected by the District Court's order.
If this is true - and the
Government apparently has not believed it necessary to dispute it - appellant's response to the
subpoena would be a barren performance - one of

no benefit to the Grand Jury. To destroy
appellant's capacity as a news gatherer for
such a return hardly makes sense. Since the
cost to the public of excusing his attendance
is so slight, it may be said that there is here
no public interest of real substance in competition with the First Amendment freedoms that
are jeopardized.. .We hold that where it has
been shown that the public's First Amendment
right to be informed would be jeopardized by
requiring a journalist to submit to secret
Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must
respond by demonstrating a compelling need for
the witness's presence before jud4*ial process
can issue to require attendance. "i'
The Court decided that Caldwell was entitled to a
privilege to refuse to testify concerning information
received from his confidential sources, and that he was
entitled to refuse to attend the Grand jury hearings
unless the Government made out a compelling interest in
his testimony prior to his appearance. 18

THE PAPPAS DECISION
The facts pertaining to In the Matter of Paul
Pappas 1 9 are similar to those in the Caldwell case.
Defendant, Paul Passas, is a news reporter for
television station WTEV, whose principal offices are
located in New Bedford, Massachusetts.

Pappas had

been assigned to cover events occurring during the
civil disorders which broke out in New Bedford during
the summer of 1970.

On July 30, 1970, he was granted

permission by members of the Black Panther Party to
enter their New Bedford headquarters.

The permission

was granted on the following conditions:
(1)

If there was no police raid on the headquar-

ters, anything which Pappas heard or witnessed visually
was to be maintained in strict confidence;
(2)

If a police raid did occur on the headquartes

during Pappas' stay there, he would be allowed to report
on whatever occurred.
According to Pappas' attorneys, the Panthers' motives for allowing eappas to enter the headquarters was
that the Panthers wanted "fair" news coverage of a suspected imminent police raid. 2 0

The Panthers alleged

that heretofore the news media was always biased in
favor of the police during such raids.
During the approximately three hours that Pappas
was in

the headquarters,

he observed activities

occur-
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ing there, and engaged Panthers in conversation.

How-

ever, he made no written notes of his observations and
as there was no police raid that night, he did not file
a report.
Two months later, on 22 September 1970, Pappas was
summoned before the Bristol County grand jury, which
was attempting to ascertain criminal culpability for
the disturbances in New Bedford.

The grand jury asked

questions of Pappas relating to his observations in th'
Panther headquarters, which Pappas refused to answer
on the grounds that he had a limited constitutional
privilege to protect confidential sources; that to reveal such information would constitute a breach of
promise which he had made to the Panthers; that his
livelihood would be impaired by his future inability to
obtain information through the same or similar sources;
and that his testimony might place him in physical danger.
Pappas was again subpoenaed bo appear before the
grand jury.

The Superior Court for Bristol County

denied Pappas' motion to quash the subpoena and the
ruling was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.
The Supreme Judicial Court expressed the opinion
that it did not feel bound by the Ninth Circuit Court's
decision in the Caldwell case.

"Were we to adopt the

broad conclusions of that decision, that a newsman's

privilege exists because of the First imendment, we
would be engaging in judicial amendment of the Constitution or judicial legislation.

Requiring a newsman

to testify about facts of his knowledge does not prevent their publication or the circulation of information. 21
The Court summed up its holding that there exists
no newsman's privilege as follows:
"'e adhere to the view that there exists
no constitutional newsman's privilege, either
qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and
testify before a court or grand jury. The obligation of newsmien, we think, is that of every
citizen, viz., to appear when summoned, with
relevant written or other material when required,
and to tnsw.r relevant and reasonable inquiries.
Such aiearances, however, like those of other
citizens, Lre subject to supervision by the presiding judge to prevent oppressive, unnecessary,
irrelevant, and other iiproper inquiry and investigation (and, of course, subject to due
protection of the privilege of any witness
against self-incriination. )22
&hus, the Court upheld the ruling of the Superior
Court and dismissed Pappas' contention of a newsman's
privilege of non-disclosure based on the First :zlendment of the 2eder.l Constitution.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE
I.

First Pmendment Right
The public's right to the free flow of information

and news is protected by the First Amendment.

The

First Amendment protection is violated when reporters
are forced to divulge confidential sources or information.

When a First Amendment right clashes with any

asserted common law right, the presumption is that the
constitutional right must prevail.
"In contradiction to the prior cases which pondered a constitutional foundation for the journalistic
privilege, the Caldwell court did not set its focus on
the individual newspaperman's right to such a privilege
qua individual; rather it concentrated on the
First Amendment right to be informed.

'"

23

'public's

The right

sought to be protected by the reporter's privilege is
the public's First Amendment right to the free flow of
information.

The individual reporter's financial or

career interest in the privilege is irrelevant to the
question of whether the public enjoys a constitutional
right to the untrammeled flow of news.

"That books,

newspapers and magazines are published and sold for
profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First
Amendment." 2 4

In Time v. Hill 2 5 the court stated that

the constitutional guarantees in the news area "are

not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of Us.

A broadly defined freedom of

the press insures the maintenance of our political
system and an open society."
It must be kept clearly in mind that apart from
the public's constitutional right, which is protected
through the vehicle of the reporter's privilege, the
newsman and informer have no independent ground for
asserting the privilege.

"The newsman-informer rela-

tionship for its own sake is complete irrelevant.

The

sole asserted interest is free flow of news to the
public.,26
As the Supreme Court said in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v.

Federal Communications Commission 27 "The people

as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio (and, of course, in free speech by television or
the printed medium) and their collective right to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment.

It is the right of

the viewers and listeners, and not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount."

The reporter's access to

news is, in effect, the public's access.

The right of

the public to the free flow of information is at stake
here, and it may be asserted by the reporter for it is
through his agency that this constitutional right is
translated into fact, i.e.,
to the public.

the transmission of news

"The people's right to be informed by
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print and electronic news media is thus the central
concern of the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech and
8
of the Press Clause." 2

Opponents of the reporter's privilege often start
with the premise that there is no right to withhold
testimony, and they then challenge adherents of the
privilege to prove its existence at common law.
approach avoids the crux of the controversy:

This

a con-

stitutional right, not a common law privilege, is being asserted.

When the First Amendment right of free-

dom of speech and press is asserted, unless it is clear
that such claim is completely frivolous, it is incumbent upon those denying such right to disprove it.
They have the burden of proof, since

constitutional

rights must be sedulously fostered to avoid encrch,4ment
upon those rights.

When a constitutional right is at

issue, the nonexistence of that right must be clearly
demonstrated before those who deny its existence may
be allowed to prevail.
First Amendment guarantees of free press rest upon
the assumption that "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public."

29

"Under

the First Amendment, conduct tending to restrain the
free flow of news is presumed unconstitutional unless
strongly justified.",3 0 (Emphasis added.)

"Rather than

starting with the common law presumption against any
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privilege and trying to justify an exception because
of a constitutional interest, a proper analysis should
start with the constitutional presumption of a privilege and try to justify its denial because of a common
30
law interest in compulsory testimony."

Typical of

this approach would be situation in which a witness
asserted the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. ,

proper analysis presumes the consti-

tutional right acho-'es and puts the burden on those who
disagree to either prove the right is inapplicable in
the particular situation or that, though it applies,
it must fall in the stead of a conflicting and more
compelling right.
When dealing with the First Amendment, a constitutional presumption of protection is involved.

As

the Supreme Court has said, "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.",3 2

The Supreme Court has indicated that freedom

of the press is to be given "the broadest scope that
can be countenanced in an ordered society."13 3

Re-

quiring reporters to divulge confidential sources or
information would discourage those sources from transmitting news and would therefore inhibit the free flow
of news to the public in violation of the First protections.

"In holding that the Constitution secures a

journalist's privilege, the principal court relied on
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3
the public's constitutional right to be informed." 4

A form of self-censorship abhorrent to the First
Amendment would result if journalists felt the need to
temper their reporting in order to reduce the probability of interrogation, 3 5 and it will have the effect
of scaring off informants and, thus, drying up news
sources.

It is an established fact that many news

stories are based on information disclosed in confidence.

Erwin D. Canham, Editor-in-Chief of the Chris-

tian Science Monitor, has estimated that from 33% to
50% of the newspaper's major stories involve confidential sources, and the Wall Street Journal has
stated that at least 15% of its stories are based on
information received from confidential sources. 3 6

The

First Amendment right of the public will be infringed
upon if reporters are involuntarily brought before
grand juries seeking testimony as to the reporters'
confidential sources, and informants are less likely to
come forward if they face the risk of exposure.

Re-

garding the informant, "His communication...is probably
the result of calculation and more likely to be affected by the risk of exposure."

37

Other authorities have similarly noted this problem:
,It is not unreasonable to expect journalists
everywhere to temper their reporting so as to
reduce the probability that they will be required to submit to interrogation. The First
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iAmendment guards against gover ental action
that induces self-censorship.22
"Without certainty, parties responsible for
the dissemination of information to the public
will be unable to predict when the state can
suppress their activities. Thus there is a
substantial possibility that they will unduly
censor their publications to avoid punishment.1139
"The mere threat of sanctions may deter the
exercise of free speech or free association
almost as much as the actual application of
sanctions. 40
"The right to confidential news gathererinformant relationship has been found to bp1
within the First Amendment press freedom."&l
The Department of Justice, which now argues against
a reporter's privilege, has in its guidelines admitted
that action such as was taken in the Caldwell case could
violate the public's and, by proxy, a reporter's First
imzendment rights.

The ;-ttorney General's Guidelines,

issued on August 11, 1970, state that "The Department
of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some
circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise
of First

nirendment rights.

"4 2

The argument that many sources, such as the Black
Panthers, who probably depend to a large extent on
media exposure, would still communicate to the public
by means of press release does not vitiate the infringement or encroachment upon the free flow of news to the
public is an invasion that should not be lightly countenanced.

If reporters, the newsgathering agents of the
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public, are unduly imposed upon, the public's right to
access to news is violated.

"It is not enough that the

public's knowledge of groups such as the Black Panthers
should be confined to their deliberate public pronouncements or distant news accounts of their occasional dramatic forays into the public view. " 4 3

'.The

public's right to know is not satisfied by news media
which act as conveyor belts for handouts and releases,
and as stationary eye-witnesses.

It is satisfied only

if reporters can undertake independent, objective investigations.

11 -

If First Amendment rights are not guarded, they
may be eroded.

"It is characteristic of the freedoms

of expression in general that they are vulnerable to
'4 5

gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments.1

"The freedoms of expression must be ringed about with
"
adequate bulwarks. 46

In order to protect the public's First Amendment
right to the free flow of news, reporters must be
afforded the constitutional protection, as news gathering agents of the public, of refusal to appear before
grand juries that seek information related to the
newsman's confidential sources or information.

"The

weight of the First Amendment is on the reporters'
side, because the assumption underlying the First Amendment is that secrecy and the control of news are all
too inviting, all too easily achieved, and in general,

107
The First Amendment weds the

all too undesirable.

public interest in the flow of news to the reporter's
professional interest, and it is this public interest,
not the reporter's" 4

7

that the First Amendment pro-

tects.
II.

Tests of Clear and Compelling Need
As the reporter's privilege is based on a consti-

tutional right, before that right can give way to the
need for compelled testimony, a clear and compelling
need for that testimony must be shown.

Proof of clear

and compelling need may be established when three tests
are met:
(1)

A crime was committed and it is proved that

the reporter has specific knowledge concerning that
crime;
(2)

The Government has no alternative means of

obtaining the information.

The Government must demon-

strate that due diligence was used in trying to obtain
the information elsewhere;
(3)

The violation of which the reporter has

knowledge is a major crime.
The power to compel testimony is not absolute:

It

often must yield to overriding considerations involving
the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments and alse to the
the various privileged communications recognized at
common law or by state.

"An adequate foundation for
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inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner
as will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail
or inhibit constitutionally protected activities.

''4 8

There is a clear need for proof that the reporter
has specific information that is sought.

If the govern-

ment could compel testimony without having to establish
that a reporter had information needed by the Government, this would open the door to fishing expeditions
into the murkiest of waters, inviting an encroachment
and trampling on protected constitutional rights.

As

the public's right to know is protected by the Constitution, the case made by those seeking the protected
information must be so overwhelmingly strong as to
override the constitutional protections.

It is there-

fore obvious that before the Government is allowed to
tread on constitutional protections, it must be clear
that the reporter at least has sought the information.
Otherwise there could be an invasion of constitutional
rights to promote a wild fishing expedition or to compel a "barren performance."
It is clear that the "no alternative means" test
is needed.

Before constitutional rights are put in

jeopardy, the need for the information protected by
those rights must be compelling.

Obviously, the need

for the information cannot be compelling if the information is obtainable elsewhere.

In speaking of the

possible infringement upon First Amendment rights by
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the grant jury's power to compel testimony, the United
States District Court in Caldwell said "Such power
shall not be exercised in a manner likely to (infringe
First Amendment rights) until there has been a clear
showing of a compelling and overriding national inter4
est that cannot be served by alternative means."

9

As to the requirement that the reporter has the
specific knowledge, "A concomitant of the right to a
protected relationship should be the requirement that
the party seeking the newsman's testimony show cause
that the reporter has reason to know about the defendant and his alleged criminal acts."5

0

,The requisite

showing should include specific evidence, such as the
reporter's own writings or testimony of government informers, that the reporter has information relating to
elements of the alleged crime."

1

The Department of Justice Guidelines support the
need for minimal tests that must be met before a newsman can be forced to reveal confidential sources and
information.

The Department of Justice "does not con-

sider the press
ments'"

'an investigative arm of the govern-

The Guidelines stipulate that all reasonable

efforts be made to obtain the sought information from
non-media sources before subpoenas are issued to reporters; that there be sufficient reason, based on
information obtained from non-press sources, to believe
that a crime has been committed, and that the press not
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be used "as a spring board for investigations'; and
that there be sufficient reason to believe "that the
information sought is essential to a successful
investigation---- particularly with reference to didrectly establishing the guilt or innocence... (and
that a subpoena) should not be used to obtain peripheral, non-essential or speculative information."
There seems to be an implied condition that even where
the guidelines requirements are satisfied, "great
caution should be observed in requesting subpoena
authorization from the Attorney General for unpublished
information, or where an orthodox First Amendment defense is raised or where a serious claim of confidentiality is alleged.

'5 2

In neither Caldwell nor Pappas was there any
demonstration of proof that the coveted information was
of paramount importance on questions of guilt or innocence.

Pappas was devoid of any proof that a crime had

been committed of which the reporter had any knowledge.
Neither case contained evidence of due diligence in
attempting to obtain the information from alternative
sources.
In Caldwell and Pappas, quite clearly, the first
two tects have not been met.

However, even where they

were met, a further analysis of the situation under
investigation is in order.

Before we allow infringe-

ment of First Amendment rights, we should be convinced

that the investigation has focused on a major crime.
This should be the case in view of the serious effect
to the flow of news that could result from a reporter's
compelled appearance.
he becomes --

"If the reporter must testify,

and it will be known

uhat reporters have

become -- and investigative arm of the government, and
he will not again be able to obtain evidence of the
5 3

crime in confidence.11

In all cases a weighing process is involved.
Certainly, for the heinous crimes of murder or arson,
a compelling need for the testimony should be shown if
the other criteria were met.

For so-called "victim-

less" crimes, such as prostitution or abortion, the
need for the testimony can never be compelling enough
to outweigh the need to protect the confidential relationship.

The type of balancing test used in Dennis

v. United States5 4 is the kind of standard called for
here.

The court should consider "whether the gravity

of the

'evil' discounted by its improbability, justi-

fies such invation of free press as is necessary to
avoid the dangers."

55

"Although the direct censorship of newspapers
or broadcasts would constitute a more blatant -because historically more familiar and, of
course, differently motivated -- violation of
the First Amendment, forcing disclosure of reporters' confidences is not very different in
effect. It is a form of indirect, and perhaps
random, but highly effective censorship.. .for
the forced disclosure fo reporters' confidences
will abort the gathering and analysis of news,
and thus, of course, restrain its dissemination.

In the circumstances, only an imperative need
to punish or prevent commission of a major
crime, if indeed any countervailing consideration at all, can possibly justify inflicting
such injury on the vital interests protected
56
by the First ioiendment. '
III.

Conclusion
The public's right to free flow of information

under the First Amendment is protected through the reporters' privilege to refuse to rectify as to confidential sources or information, and, concomitantly, to
refuse to appear when, by reason of the constitutional
protections, such appearance would be a barren performance, which would be of no worth to the grand jury,
but which could prejudice the reporter's news gathering
capacity.

.1here First Ihmendment rights are asserted,

the three minimal tests, (proof that the reporter has
the needed information; inability to obtain it from
alternative sources after efforts with due diligence;
and an investigation involving a major crime), must be
met before the First Amendment protections are deemed
subservient to the Government's power to compel testimony.
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALLEGED "NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE"
Freedom of the press is one of the most sacred
liberties enjoyed by the citizens of our country.
antedates the nation's independence.

It

In the Caldwell and Pappas cases, the Defendants
'
have urged that the "freedom of the pre s" clause of

the First Amendment affords a protection to all newsmen
who are engaged in reportorial activity by providing
them with a privilege to refrain from disclosing their
sources of information or information secured in confidence when required to reveal them.

In both cases,

the instrumentality requiring the information was a
Grand Jury which was investigating matters preparatory
to potential criminil indictments. 5 7

The defendants

employed a similar argument in assertion of the alleged
'newsman's privilege."
"The threat that a reporter may have to disclose...
confidences has a chilling effect on his relationships
with news sources and...could eventually destroy any
5 8

possibility of a free flow of information."1

This allegation is, by admission of counsel for
one of the defendant reporters, the "single most compelling" prop butressing the claim of privilege. 5

9

The

advocates of the alleged privilege have, as part of
their argument, asserted that the "right to gather
news" requires that newsmen be permitted to conceal
their sources of information in order to insure that the
sources will continue to provide information on a regular basis.
When analyzing the contentions asserted with respect to the alleged privilege, it behooves one to

ll
examine previous cases which have been concerned with
The case which has been regarded as most
60
which
prominent in the field is Garlend v. Torre,
the subject.

came before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit fourteen years ago.

Judy Garland, the

entertainer, had brought an action against the Columbia
Broadcasting System, alleging libel based on a defamatory comment in a newspaper column attributed to an
unidentified executive of CbS.

In order to maintain

her cause of action, it became necessary for Miss
Garland to establish the identify of the executive.
She sought this information by subpojwa-zig the reporter
to whom the allegect defamatory comment was made by the
executive.

The reporter refused to provide the identi-

ty of the executive, claiming a privilege to refuse
revelation of the identities of confidential news
sources.
In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Judge (now
Justice) Stewart wrote:
"Freedom of the press, hard-won over the
centuries by men of courage, is basic to a free
society. But basic too are courts of justice,
armed with the power to discover the truth. Tie
concept that it is the duty of a witness to
testify in a court of law has roots fully as
deep in our history as does the guarantee of a
free press."Ol
"If an additional First A.mendment liberty-the freedom of the press--is here involved, we
do not hesitate to conclude that it too must
give place under the Constitution to a paramount
public interest in the fair administration of

justice...The Constitution conferred, o
right
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answer
an
refuse
to
newswoman)
a
(of
to a question put forth in the discovery process.
The Court clearly indicated that there is no constitutional newsman's privilege emanating from the
First 'mendment.

Indeed, it has been recognized by

several courts that there are limits to the right and
privileges which one can claim under the guise of
"freedom of the press."

"Freedom of the press, preci-

ous and vital though it is to a free society is not an
absolute." 63
A newsman's privilege to refuse to disclose his
sources of information does not fall within the ambit
of the First Amendment.

"The language of (the Federal)

Constitution is clear, and by no stretch of language
can it protect or include under 'freedom of the press'

,64

the non-disclosure of sources of information.6

In a 1970 federal case in Maryland, District Judge
Thompson, writing for the Court, denying an alleged
constitutional newsman's privilege, stated that
"I do not believe that the First izendment
or any other provision of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States prevents the Court
from compelling representatives of the New York
Times to make a limited disclosure of the sour e
or sources of the information they received.1199
66
the United
Similarly, Adams v. Associated Press,

States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, after considering the question of abridgement of
freedom of the press under the First Amendment, ruled
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that a reporter for the Associated Press had no privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of his confidential source of information.
In another case, involving the alleged newsman's
privilege, members of the editorial board of the
Philadelphia Bulletin were required by a Grand Jury to
produce tape recordings of interviews and conversations
with one John J. Fitzpatrick, who was then under investigation by the Grand Jury in connection with
criminal charges stemming from alleged bribery and
government corruption.

Also required were the notes,

memoranda, and other documents in possession of the
Bulletin which the newspaper had obtained as a result
of its confidential relationship with Fitzpatrick.

The

newsmen refused to comply with the Grand Jury subpoena
of these materials and were cited for contempt.

The

Bulletin then appealed the contempt citations to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Writing for the Court,

the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania wrote that "The contention that ...the Constitutionally ordained privilege
of freedom of the press encompasses and includes the
right of non-disclosure of sources of information is
devoid of merit."
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It has been recognized by the courts and by legal
scholars that the existence of a newsman's privilege
would run counter to one of the most basic principles
of the imerican system---that which requires the
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cooperation of the citizenry in the pursuit of justice
through law.

As Chief Justice Hughes states, "One

of the duties which the citizen owes to his government
is to support the administration of justice by attendind its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is
properly summoned."
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The legitimate administration of justice is fundamental to the existence of the democratic society.

The

courts and their agencies must be granted a sufficient
breadth of freedom to enable them to function in their
most important role in society -- the protection of
the public welfare, of the rights of the individual,
and of the citizenry at large.

The imposition of the

purported newsman's privilege would be an obstacle to
the proper performance of the courts in their imperative capacity as arbiters of the truth.
chief objections

"One of the

(to newsman's privilege) especially of

the courts and the legal profession, to granting such aprerogative to newspapermen is the fear that it will
result in weakening the authority of the courts, and
in the exclusion of necessary evidence, thus becoming
an obstacle to the ocirect disposal of litigation."
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With respect to the alleged First Amendment freedoms, the United States Supreme Court has held that
where the greater good in discovery of the truth demands
it, the individual must subordinate his rights to those
of society.

"The personal sacrifice involved (loss of
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a First Amendment freedom) is a part of the necessary
contribution of the individual to the welfare of the
public. ' 7 0

In the Caldwell and Pappas cases, the

"welfare of the public" demands that Grand Jury investigations into criminal activity directed against the
public be given appropriately extensive latitude to
discover the truth.

Where a confidence comes into

conflict with the rights of society, that confidence
must yield.

Advocates of the privilege have stated

correctly that freedom of the press is a right of the
public, not of the individual reporter.

Certainly, a

right of the public should not be perverted so as to
defeat a greater right of the public --

that of judi-

cial discovery of the truth.
It has been held that where First Amendment freedoms are challenged, they are not absolute.

" D es-

pite the broad scope and protective status of the First
Amendment freedoms and privileges, it is clear that none
of them is absolute, and that whether, in any given
case, an asserted right under that amendment will prevail or not depends upon the particular circumstances
involved... ,,71
The Supreme Court has recognized that alleged First
Amendment freedoms may come into conflict with valid
governmental functions,

which in

the case of Grand Jury

investigations, are authorized by the Fifth Amendment.
"Whenever these (First Amendment) constitutional
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protections are asserted against the exercise of valid
governmental powers, a reconciliation must be effected,
and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of
the respective interests involved."

73

However, before there can be a weighing process,
there must first be a determination that a First Amendment protection would avail to the news reporter in the
establishment of a privilege of non-disclosure of confidential information and sources.
As previously noted, the news media alleges the
"freedom of the press" defense on the following bases:
(1)

Gathering of the news is a constitutionally

protected right of reporters.

To compel disclosure of

news sources would cause the sources to refrain from
future communication with the reporters from fear of
reprisals or punishment and would have a "chilling"
effect on the ability of the reporter to gather news;
(2)

The gathering of news is essential to the

free flow of information to the public.

Any impedi-

ment, whether direct or indirect, on the ability of
the press to gather news results in a consequent "trammeling" to the free flow of information to the public;

(3) To reveal the sources of information would be
a breach of promise and a violation of the conditions
by which the reporter was granted access to the source.
As to the third argument above, one of the reporter's risks of his profession is that if he permits
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himself to enter into a confidential relationship in
obtaining information, he must be prepared to suffer
the consequences of maintaining the confidence in the
face of legitimate orders to reveal the source.

"The

mere fact that a communication is made in confidence,
express or implied, does not of itself create a privilege. " 7 4

The courts are under no obligation to respect

a confidence where that confidence jeopardizes the discovery of the truth.
With respect to the contention concerning the
gathering of news as a constitutionally protected activity, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recognized that even if news gathering was protected by
the First Amendment (and this was only assumed arguendo
by the Court) it is not unconditional. 75

There are

definite limits on the right to gather news.
case of In re Goodfader's Appeal

In the

the Supreme Court of

Hawaii admitted that there would be "disadvantages to
a news reporter" where sources had been revealed against
a pledge that they would remain in confidence, but that
these disadvantages, such as in future communication
with the sources, do not give rise to a claim for impairment of constitutional righits.
The contention that the free flow of information
to the public would be impaired by a failure to impose
a reporter's privilege of non-disclosure is without
merit.

"(T)he contention that a denial of immunity

from compulsory disclosure will destroy many sources
of news, or weaken the relationship between newspapermen and their informants in a very questionable reason
for according a privilege between confidential informers and newspapermen... such information can often
be gathered despite the fact that communications between newspapermen and their informers remain unprivileged. "7 7

Indeed, at common law there was no privilege

and only recently have a minority of the States enacted
statutes creating such a privilege. 7 8

A majority of

the States have rejected the privilege, as has the
Congress of the United States.

yet, during the history

of our nation, despite the lack of a newsman's privilege, the news has been gathered and disseminated to
the public.
peded.

The flow of information has not been im-

There has been a dearth of cases brought by

newsmen on the privilege question, indicative in itself of the fact that the lack of a privilege has not
been an obstacle to the reporter's ability to gather
the news.
In recent years, however, members of the news media
have argued vigorously for the establishment of a
privilege.

The evidence indicates that the advocacy

of the privilege is in no way connected with a concern
with impairment of news gathering.
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"While it is familiarly argued that the gathering
and dissemination of news are inseparable parts of the
same publishing process, it hardly follows logically
therefrom that the denial of a constitutionallyprotected right of non-disclosure of the identity of
news sources effectively impairs the free flow of news
'7
from source to public."

9

There is no need for a privilege of non-disclosure
even on the bases asserted by the Defendants in the
Caldwell and Pappas cases, either to protect a First
Amendment freedom or as a logical extension of public
policy.
The contention of the media that they are
acting in the public interest in espousal of
a non-disclosure doctrine, has been refuted:
"Claims of a protected source privilege are
not in reality based on the public interest in
the free flow of information, but rather on
the interest of a limited number of individuals
in a certain occupational group in avoiding
imprisonment or payment of fines when held in
contempt of court for refusal to identify news
sources. Such finds and imprisonment are, in
effect, but risks of a particular trade
and
0
costs of doing business therein."
Thus the effort by the news media to gain a nondisclosure privilege is seen not in terms of advancing
First Amendment freedoms, but of furthering the business objectives of a specialized industry in promoting
its own economic and vocational goals.

In parading as

paladins of the public's right to information in their
efforts to gain the privilege, the powerful news media
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has attempted to prostitute the Constitution to its own
desires.
"The real danger and significance of the
recent case decisions where freedom of the
press has been invoked as a basis for a reporter's non-disclosure of the identity of
sources lies in the tacit judicial recognition
of some validity of the proposal. By stating
hypothetically that compelled disclosure of
news sources entails some abridgement of freedoa of the press in limiting the availability
of the news, the door is opened to allowing
undue extensions pf the freedom of the press
guarantee to accomplish primarily economic aims
of a powerful occupational group to the detriment of the public generally, when resulting in
an effective denial of the orderly administration of justice. Recognition of the necessity
of a free and informative press in a democratic
society is unchallenged. Discrimination in
favor of news media as a certain private enterprise segment of society presents markedly
different questions." 1
It is thus perceived in actuality that the frecdom
of the press is completely removed as a basis for any
newsman's privilege.

Not only has it been rejected

by the courts as a right deriving from the First Amendment, but it appears from the evidence produced by the
legal writers that the privilege or lack of it has no
noticeable effect on the free flow of information from
news sources to the public, and that the privilege has
been asserted merely as a device by the news media to
achieve its own business objectives.
Thus, as the First Amendment is not truly involved,
arguments put forth by the news media that the decision
in New York Times v. Sullivan 8 2 would support a
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privilege of non-disclosure are completely spurious.
The conditions which the Times decision was concerned
with are not present in the Caldwell and Pappas cases.
Therefore, no comment is necessary on the merits of
the media's contentions concerning the Times decision
except to note that even if First Amendment rights were
involved in the newsman's privilege, the Times decision would not compel recognition of such a privilege.
One additional argument against the establishment
of the newsman's privilege has been asserted in State
v. Buchanan.8 3

The Supreme Court of Oregon, sitting

En Banec, declared that "the only issue is whether freedom of the press gives the reporter a constitutional
right to preserve the anonymity of an informer in the
face of a court order requiring disclosure." 8 4

The

issue arose upon a court order in aid of a Grand Jury
investigation into the use of marijuana in Lane County,
Oregon. 8 5

The defendant news reporter had promised

seven persons that if they permitted her to interview
them for publication, she would under no circumstances
reveal their identities.

86

In striking down the alleged constitutional privilege, the Court held that
"it would be difficult to rationalize a
rule that would create special constitutional
rights for those possessing credentials as
news gatherers which would not conflict with
the equal privileges and equal protection concepts also found in the Constitutioni.
Freedom
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of the press is a right which belongs to the
public; it is not the private reserve of those
who possess the implements of publishing."7
(Emphasis added.)
"There is no more infringment of constitutional
rights in compelling a newsman to disclose the sources
of his information than there is in compelling any
other person to make a disclosure.

No limitation what-

ever on the right to publish is imposed."

88

'We hold that there is no constitutional reason
for creating a qualified right for some, but not for
others, to withhold evidence as an aid to newsgathering
...nothing in the.. .federal constitution compels the
courts, in the absence of a statute, to recognize such
a privilege."

89

The Court here saw the investing of one class with
the constitutional status of privilege while denying
the privilege to less favored classes as a denial of
equal protection of the laws.

Thus, a privilege of

non-disclosure extended to one class would have to be
extended to all classes of persons in order to satisfy
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

This,

assuredly, would result in the total inability of the
judicial system to function, as testimony would be restricted to the point where the discovery process
would become a simulacrum and justice would be denied
to the public.

Thus, a basic pillar of an orderly

democratic society -- the ability of the courts to
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freely adjudicate cases and controversies before them
--would be destroyed.
In In re Goodfader's Appeal, the Court noted that
in Burdick v. United States, 9 0 the Supreme Court upheld the right of an editor to refuse to reveal his
news sources.

However, the right was asserted under

the Fifth Amendment, not the First.

The importance of

this distinction is revealed in Barenblatt v. United
States, 91 in which the Court stated that although the
Fifth Amendment affords the witness the right to refuse inquiry, protections under the First Amendment do
not give witnesses that automatic right.

There is no

automatic privilege to refuse to answer questions put
forth by an agency of the Government under the First
Amendment.
In summary, there is no First Amendment constitutional right to refuse to answer questions respecting
sources of information. 92

The leading cases on news-

man's privilege, Garland v. Torre and In re Goodfader's
Appeal held that "the public interest in the adjudication of disputes outweighed any private rights of
newsmen." 93

There are no legitimate First Amendment

Rights which are sought to be protected by the imposition of the newsman's privilege, only the private designs of a specialized industry whose power rivals that
of the Government.

The interests of society in the

administration of justice take absolute precedence
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where there is no countervailing constitutional freedom which is required to be upheld.
One should agree with the Court in Pappas that
,the opinion in the Caldwell case largely disregards
important interests of the Federal government and the
several States in enforcement of the criminal law for
the benefit of the general public." 94

The Caldwell

decision should be considered to be a judicial aberration.
There also appear to be serious questions as to
whether a newsman's privilege would be in keeping with
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This would apply not only to the alleged consti-

tutional privilege, but also to those granted by statute
in a number of States.
"To recognize the (newsman's) privilege
asserted here.. .would poorly serve the cause
of justice."95
Any right to refuse testimony with respect to
sources of information should arise in the traditional
manner, in the presiding judge's exercise of supervision over the Grand Jury, where he has the discretion
"to prevent excessive or unnecessary interference with
the legitimate interests of witnesses, e.g. by too
broad subpoenas."96
The role of the press is to search out the truth;
such is also the function of the Grand Jury.

The two
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institutions, therefore, are not incompatible.

Vhen-

ever the truth is suppressed, no matter under what
guise, freedom must suffer.

Freedom of the press de-

mands revelation of the truth.

For the press to

suppress the truth under the guise of privilege is to
stifle the very constitutional guarantees which allow
the press to function.
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